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Abstract 
This research aims to measure and compare the moral hazard behaviour of micro and 
small enterprises’ debtors within Purwokerto area on Productive Business Loan scheme. This 
scheme was choosen because of the highest Non Performing Loan (NPL) among others. The 
data were collected from 127 debitors by using simple random sampling technique. Rating 
scale method was used to measure the moral hazard behaviours of debtors through 
questionnaire and later comparing them to study how serious the noncompliance rate in 
repaying off their credits. This research finds that (1) Generally, the moral hazard behaviour 
tends to be medium-to-high, (2) The highest moral hazard should be attributed to debitors in 
Purbalingga followed by those in Banjarnegara, Purwokerto, and Cilacap. Then, it suggests 
that (1) all bank branches need to pay more attentions to their debitors because their moral 
hazard behaviours have been medium-to-high. (2) Each branch needs to apply specific 
treatments to the debitors to improve debitors’ installments, i.e building lending relationship 
as one way of exploring soft information which emphasizes informal approaches, (3) It should 
be important to design integrated training and practices for bank officers in order to build up 
their sense of psychological skills in public relationship in order to handle, in turn, those risky 
debtors.  
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Abstrak 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengukur dan membandingkan perilaku moral hazard 
debitur usaha mikro dan kecil di wilayah Purwokerto pada skema kredit Usaha Produktif 
(KUP). Skema ini dipilih karena memiliki Non Performing Loan (NPL) tertinggi di antara 
skema lainnya. Data dikumpulkan dari 127 debitur yang dipilih menggunakan teknik simple 
random sampling. Metode rating scale digunakan untuk mengukur perilaku moral hazard 
debitur melalui kuesioner dan kemudian membandingkannya untuk dianalisis seberapa serius 
tingkat ketidakpatuhan dalam melunasi kredit di antara mereka. Penelitian ini menemukan 
bahwa (1) Secara umum, perilaku moral hazard debitur cenderung menengah ke tinggi, (2) 
moral hazard tertinggi dimiliki para debitur di Purbalingga diikuti oleh Banjarnegara, 
Purwokerto, dan Cilacap. Penelitian ini memberikan implikasi bahwa (1) Semua cabang 
bank perlu memberikan perhatian lebih kepada para debiturnya karena perilaku moral 
hazard mereka sudah cenderung menengah ke tinggi, (2) Setiap cabang bank perlu 
menerapkan perlakuan khusus kepada para debiturnya untuk meningkatkan angsuran 
debitor, seperti membangun lending relationship sebagai salah satu cara menggali soft 
information yang menekankan pendekatan informal, (3) Penting untuk merancang pelatihan 
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dan praktik terpadu bagi petugas bank untuk membangun keterampilan psikologis mereka 
dalam public relationship yang akan diterapkan untuk menghadapi para debitur yang 
bermasalah. 
 
Kata Kunci: moral hazard, debitur, non performing loan, kredit usaha produktif. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Asymmetric information often 
happens in monetary field including 
funding-lending system in financial 
institutions, e.g. banks. The impact of this 
condition is most likely the presence of 
adverse selection and/or moral hazard by 
the bank or the debtor or both parties. It is 
so hard to confirm who the doer is. Some 
experiences found that financing micro and 
small enterprises (MSEs) has more 
difficulties rather than the largers because 
of the lack of information and historical 
data of their business hence the presence of 
asymmetric information is totally 
convinced. In this case, asymmetric 
information in financing MSEs induces the 
presence of moral hazard attributed to 
debitors (Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman & 
Hart, 1983).  
First, the indication of asymmetric 
information presence could be appeared 
through non performing loan (NPL) 
measure. It values the debitors 
noncompliance of credit contract where the 
postponed installments was happened 
Then, that indication must be observed 
what the causes are; some evidences 
showed that the causes might be come 
from debitors’ moral hazard through their 
attempt not to obey some items in credit 
contract (Nicholson & Snyder, 2012). 
Bank Indonesia (2016) has reported 
that Local Development Bank (LDB), in 
2016, shows high NPL of productive credit 
scheme to MSEs. Less experiences, skills, 
and knowledges of bank officers for 
financing productive schemes, especially 
for MSEs, are the major causes of this 
case, where so far LDB has focused on 
consumptive credit—as much as 66 
percents of total credits lended—so that the 
officers faced some difficulties to manage 
the productive credit because of the 
different characters and procedures 
(Damayanti & Adam, 2015).   
This case illustrates two interesting 
points relating to asymmetric information 
issues, namely adverse selection and moral 
hazard. In the case of adverse selection, the 
lack of bank officers/credit analyst ability 
in selecting potential debtors in turn can 
cause credit repayment problems, even 
default, resulting from their failures in 
operating their business. Meanwhile, in 
terms of moral hazard, after signing credit 
contract, the debtors appear the 
noncompliance behaviour impacting on 
postponed instalment (Nicholson & 
Snyder, 2012; Damayanti & Adam, 2015). 
This moral hazard might be caused by 
adverse selection happened before—innate 
cause. But it could be also appeared purely 
as long as credit contract, not preceded by 
adverse selection.    
In accordance with high NPL and 
less ratio of LDB productive credit, this 
study takes Bank Jateng—one of LDB 
authorizing Central Java province—as 
representation of those conditions. 
Therefore, since early 2017 Bank Jateng 
has issued the policy that credit financing 
to productive sectors, particularly MSEs, 
should be more proportion (Bank Jateng, 
2017). Then, productive credit scheme 
chosen for analysis object is Productive 
Business Loan (Kredit Usaha 
Produktif/KUP) because of its highest 
NPL, i.e. 7.01, compared with other 
schemes (KUMK, Kridakop, etc.). 
Thereby, the important issue that is 
interesting to investigate is debitors’ moral 
hazard of KUP arised from asymmetric 
information presence that is signed by its 
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high NPL. Therefore, this study aims to 
analyze debitors’ moral hazard of KUP to 
explain how high moral hazard attributed 
to debitors, is it risky enough? This 
analysis is aplied to those debitors of four 
Bank Jateng branches within Purwokerto 
area then comparing each debitors’ moral 
hazard to be consideration of setting proper 
strategies and treatments for each branch. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Asymmetric information indicates state 
of imbalance in accessing information 
among parties. It could cause any 
conditions such moral hazard and adverse 
selection. In credit market, asymmetric 
information leads inefficiency and credit 
risk where cash flows of funds do not work 
well (Greuning & Bratanovic, 2000; 
Nicholson & Snyder, 2012). Some 
researches found that many obstacles faced 
in financing to MSEs. Lack of information 
is a major problem in credit lending to 
them in Albania (Zeneli & Zaho, 2014). In 
Baltik States, there also has been many 
challenges involved in financing MSEs 
(Rupeika-Apoga, 2014). For handling 
those many difficulties, Uchida (2012) and 
de la Torre et al. (2010) suggested that 
obstacles in credit accessibility for MSEs 
could be reduced by producing soft 
information where bank officers build 
informal communication with potential, 
new, and old debtors based on mutually 
principles of partnership. Soft information 
is considerably needed to complete less 
hard information.  
In related with moral hazard, 
Mirrlees (1999) analyzed the optimum 
contract in insurance with considering the 
trade-off between premium and incentives. 
That contract was ordered by insurance 
company to minimize the moral hazard 
probability attributed to its customers. Far 
before, Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman 
& Hart (1983) have developed the moral 
hazard analysis with principal-agent 
approach to construct optimal incentive 
scheme. One of optimum contract schemes 
requires collateral to minimize risk, i.e. 
moral hazard. However, MSEs often face 
difficulty to provide collateral. Therefore, 
credit guarantee should be alternative 
solution to compensate the absence of 
collateral in order to ease credit 
accessibility to MSEs (Boschi et al., 2010).  
 
RESEARCH METHOD  
This study focuses in analyzing 
moral hazard attributed to KUP debitors of 
MSEs. Therefore samples taken are come 
from those debtors population counted by 
four branches of Bank Jateng within 
Purwokerto working area, i.e. Purwokerto, 
Purbalingga, Banjarnegara, and Cilacap. 
According to NPL, Branch of Purwokerto 
has the highest value, i.e. 14.35 (far from 
the upper limit, NPL=5), followed by 
Cilacap (7.96), Banjarnegara (7.34), later 
Purbalingga (5.63). However, the amount 
of debtors who have NPL, called as NPL-
debtors, show different order where the 
most is come from Branch of Purwokerto 
with 85 NPL-debtors of 692 all debtors, 
followed by Branch of Purbalingga with 55 
NPL-debtors of 322 all debtors, Branch of 
Banjarnegara with 28 NPL-debtors of 431 
all debtors, and then Branch of Cilacap 
with 18 NPL-debtors of 224 all debitors. 
Totally, there are 186 NPL-debitors within 
Purwokerto working area (as population). 
By proportionate random sampling 
technique (Azwar, 2014), samples taken 
are 127 debitors with details as 58 from 
Purwokerto, 38 from Purbalingga, 19 from 
Banjarnegara, and 12 from Cilacap. 
Debtor’s moral hazard is then 
explored by a set of questions arranged in 
questionnaire and must be supported by 
interview to collect comprehensive 
information. There are 24 questions which 
have been selected through several 
carefully procedures, i.e. a set of tests to 
investigates each question provided as a 
part of inseparable questionnaire before 
serving to respondents in exploring moral 
hazard. These are validity and reliability 
tests.  
The questions are constructed by 5 
aspects about credit regulation by Bank 
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Indonesia, i.e. credit compliance, financial 
information precision, credit documents 
completeness, credit contract obedience, 
credit fund usage compatibility. Each 
question must be responded by choosing 
1–10 degree of agreement, using rating 
scale method, which is the higher the 
degree the higher the moral hazard. All 
responses then must be calculated to get 
total scores which explain the high of 
moral hazard behaviour.  
After having scores of each debitor 
then it continues to calculate then conclude 
the debtor’s moral hazard behaviour of 
each branch. Those calculations then have 
to be compared. It is important to 
understand the characteristic and behaviour 
of debtors within each branch. 
For comparing them, it uses basic 
statistic measurements, i.e. average, 
maximum, and minimum. From these 
values it could be classified the highest and 
the lowest debtor’s moral hazard behaviour 
among branches. Then, compare them for 
judgments to make proper strategies and 
treatments to unique debtors with different 
behaviour of moral hazard, individually or 
each branch partially. 
 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Before analyzing moral hazard, it 
must be examined the quality of 
questionnaire which is then judged as fit 
and ready to use in exploring debtor’s 
moral hazard behaviour. Therefore the 
questionnaire must be tested by validity 
and reliability. 
Validity test attempts to make sure 
that all questions are fit to measure what 
should be measured, called valid. Because 
it was predetermined 5 factors exploring 
moral hazard then the suitable validity 
measurement is Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA). Therefore, a set of tests 
must be passed, i.e. Kaisar-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) and Bartlett’s test, Measures of 
Sampling Adequacy (MSA) test, 
Coummunalities test, and Total Variance 
Explained (TVE) test.  
First, by Kaisar-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
and Bartlett’s test, it can be found that 
KMO values at 0.878 (more than 0.7 
criterion) and Bartlett significancy shows 
at 0,0 (less than 0.05) which means that 
there is no intercorrelation matrix so fit to 
examine factor analysis. Second, by MSA 
test, it can be found that all of MSA show 
values which are more than 0.5 so then it 
means the samples taken has been 
adequate. Third, by comunnality test, it can 
be found that the value of each question 
shows at more than 0.5 which means that 
each question is able to explain moral 
hazard behaviour, partially (each question 
as a part) or generally (all questions as a 
whole). Forth, by TVE test, it can be found 
that totally, all factors can explain moral 
hazard as much as 76.449%, and partially, 
the contribution of each factor is shown 
respectively as 28.173%, 18.122%, 
11.698%, 9.814%, and 8.642% (see Table 
1). These percentages are high enough to 
explain moral hazard.   
      
Table 1. Total Variance Explained Test 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Factor Total Variance (%) Cumulative (%) 
1 6.762 28.173 28.173 
2 4.349 18.122 46.295 
3 2.807 11.698 57.993 
4 2.355 9.814 67.807 
5 2.074 8.642 76.449 
Hereafter, reliability test must be 
passed to convince the consistency of 
questionnaire though used in many times. 
Therefore, it is used Cronbach’s Alpha 
method. The result shows that the 
Cronbach’s Alpha values at 0.912 (more 
than 0.6 criterion). From this result, the 
questionnaire can be judged as reliable to 
measure moral hazard. 
Furthermore, by rating scale method 
total scores of all respons can be obtained 
and ready to be analyzed into statistical 
measurement. The average of total scores 
is 87.56 then must be categorized into 
moral hazard degree, i.e very low, low, 
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medium, high, and very high (Azwar, 
2014). It can be seen in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Moral Hazard Degree Calculation 
Category Calculation Degree 
I μ ≤ 41.80 Very low 
II 41.80 < μ ≤ 69.66 Low 
III 69.66 < μ ≤ 97.53 Medium 
IV 97.53 < μ ≤ 125.39 High 
V 125.39 < μ Very high 
Note: the categorization is based on μ and σ and the 
calculation of μ ≤ - 1.5 σ; - 1.5 σ < μ ≤ - 0.5 σ; - 0.5 
σ < μ ≤ + 0.5 σ; 0.5 σ < μ ≤ 1.5 σ; and 1.5 σ < μ. 
 
By calculation that the average score 
of moral hazard (μ) is 87.56 and standard 
deviation (σ) is 27.87. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that moral hazard degree is 
categorized in medium which is closed to 
high. This result should be as a warning to 
Bank Jateng for more appropriate 
treatments in handling NPL-debtors.  
Finally, moral hazard scores have to 
be classified by branch categories. There 
are four branches of Bank Jateng, i.e. 
Purwokerto, Banjarnegara, Cilacap, and 
Purbalingga. Table 3 shows moral hazard 
score of each branch in statistical 
measurement, i.e. maximum, minimum, 
and average.  
 
Table 3. Moral Hazard Degree by Branch 
Statistic 








Max. 116 122 127 144 
Min. 37 53 33 69 
Average 
77.28 93.95 76.83 
103.4
5 
Relative  0.322 0.391 0.320 0.431 
Degree Med. Med. Med. High 
Rank III II IV I 
 
The interesting result of this 
comparison is that Branch Purbalingga 
always shows the highest score in each 
statistic, i.e. 103.45 in average score. It 
means that Branch Purbalingga has the 
highest moral hazard degree of debtors. It 
can also be seen at relative score, i.e. 0,43, 
meaning that 43 percent of total unpaid 
installments might be taken by debtors as 
moral hazard behavior and the rest (57 
percent) is caused by other acceptable 
reasons (i.e. inflation, negative growth, 
lost, etc.).  
It is also important result that Branch 
Purbalingga has high level of moral hazard 
while three others have medium one. 
Therefore, it needs very specific treatments 
by Branch Purbalingga to set strategies and 
approaches to their debtors. Lending 
Relationship might be one way that would 
be recommended to be applied. As 
suggested by de la Torre et al. (2010), 
Zambaldi et al. (2011) that lending 
relationship should be needed to build 
better communication between bank and 
debtors by improving awareness that their 
relationship is mutually partnership. This 
suggestion is also come from Uchida 
(2012) about the importance of 
constructing soft information between 
them with emphasizing informal 
approaches. Therefore, it should be 
important to design integrated training and 
practices for bank officers in order to build 
up their sense of psychological skills in 
public relationship.     
However, other branches, i.e. 
Purwokerto, Banjarnegara, and Cilacap, 
should also put serious priority to handle 
their debitors. The reason is that medium 
level of moral hazard is not exactly safe 
even early warning to be hold for reducing 
or at least not jumping to higher level. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research aims to measure and 
compare the level of moral hazard of micro 
and small enterprises’ debitors of four 
Bank Jateng Branches within Purwokerto 
area on Productive Business Loan scheme. 
This scheme was choosen as the highest 
Non Performing Loan (NPL) among 
others. The data were collected from 127 
debitors who were selected using simple 
random sampling technique. Rating scale 
method was used to measure the level of 
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moral hazard of debtors showed by each 
branches then comparing them to study 
how serious the repayment rate among 
branches. This research find that (1) 
generally, the degree of debtor’s moral 
hazard tends to be medium-to-high, (2) the 
highest moral hazard is attributed to 
debtors of Branch Purbalingga followed by 
Banjarnegara, Purwokerto, and Cilacap.  
This research suggests that (1) all 
branches need to pay more attentions to 
their debtors because of their medium-high 
moral hazard, (2) each branch needs to 
apply specific treatments to its debtors to 
improve debitors’ installments, i.e lending 
relationship as one way in building soft 
information which emphasizes informal 
approaches, (3) it should be important to 
design integrated training and practices for 
bank officers in order to build up their 
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